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Confidentiality of Pretrial Services Information
under the Speedy Trial Act*
In 1974 Congress passed the Speedy Trial Act to "assist in reducing
crime and the danger of recidivism by requiring speedy trials and by
strengthening the supervision over persons released pending trial."'
Title 112 of the Act establishes experimental pretrial services agencies
(PSAs) in 10 federal districts. Five of these agencies are governed by
the Division of Probation of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, and five are controlled by boards of trustees.3 The
purpose of Title II is to test whether PSAs can reduce pretrial deten-
* Much of the information in this Note is the product of personal interviews. Special
thanks are given to Judd Kutcher, Elsie Reid, and Guy Willetts of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts; Dan Ryan, Chief Pretrial Services Officer in the
Eastern District of New York; and Bruce Beaudin, Director of the District of Columbia
Bail Agency.
1. Pun. L. No. 93-619, preamble, 88 Stat. 2076 (1974). Congress believed that speedy
trials would reduce crime primarily by shortening the period during which defendants
released pretrial could commit crimes. Lengthy pretrial delays also result in loss of
evidence and disappearance of witnesses, forcing the Government to abandon otherwise
valid prosecutions. S. REP. No. 93-1021, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-8 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
SENATE REPORT].
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-3156 (Supp. V 1975).
3. Id. § 3153(a), (b). See H.R. REP. No. 93-1508, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-47 (1974), re-
printed in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 7420-21. The Division of Probation
operates PSAs in the Central District of California, the Northern District of Georgia, the
Northern District of Illinois, the Southern District of New York, and the Northern
District of Texas. The remaining PSAs are administered by boards of trustees composed
of the chief judge of the federal district court, the United States attorney, the public
defender, a member of the local defense bar, the chief probation officer, and representa-
tives of community organizations appointed by the chief judge. 18 U.S.C. § 3153(b)(2)
(Supp. V 1975). Boards of trustees operate PSAs in the District of Maryland, the Eastern
District of Michigan, the Western District of Missouri, the Eastern District of New
York, and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania [hereinafter referred to as trustee dis-
tricts]. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTA-
TION OF TITLE I AND TITLE II OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT OF 1974, at 26 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT]. The statute requires the Director of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Courts to report to Congress, comparing the
accomplishments of those districts governed by the Division of Probation with those
governed by boards of trustees. 18 U.S.C. § 3155(a) (Supp. V 1975).
Technical assistance is provided to all 10 districts by the Pretrial Services Branch
of the Division of Probation of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra at 28.
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tion, absconding, and the incidence of crimes committed while on
bail.4
Congress believed that these objectives could be achieved in part
through better-informed release decisions, more careful selection of
pretrial release options for defendants, and supervision of some re-
leased defendants. 5 Accordingly, Title II authorizes PSAs to collect
information relevant to the pretrial release decision, to recommend
appropriate release conditions, and to supervise persons on release."
PSAs must depend primarily upon defendants for the information
necessary to carry out these functions. Congress was concerned that
the use of this information for purposes other than bail determination
might discourage defendants from providing complete and accurate
information.7 Therefore, in order to encourage defendants to co-
operate with the PSA program, Title II places certain restrictions on
the use of information gathered by PSAs.8 Further restrictions have
4. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 24-25. See 18 U.S.C. § 3155(a) (Supp. V 1975).
By introducing crime control objectives into the pretrial release process, Title I seems
to contemplate that PSAs will consider the likelihood that a defendant may commit a
crime if released. Under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3041, 3141-3143, 3146-3152,
3568 (1970) (governing release of federal defendants), however, conditions of pretrial
release may be imposed in noncapital cases only to ensure a defendant's appearance at
trial. 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a) (1970); United States v. Leathers, 412 F.2d 169, 171 (D.C. Cir.
1969). See also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951). Since Title II does not explicitly
change existing law, there is a serious tension between the crime control goals of Title
II and the legitimate purposes of bail that is not acknowledged in the statute or its
legislative history.
Congress recognized, however, that, despite legal restrictions, judges routinely consider
the safety of the community in making release decisions and may detain defendants be-
cause of fear that if released they will commit subsequent crimes. SENATE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 24-25. Without amending the Bail Reform Act or endorsing preventive deten-
tion, Title II attempts to facilitate pretrial release by accommodating these concerns
through the provision of PSA supervision as an alternative to detention.
5. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 24-25.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 3154 (Supp. V 1975). PSAs were modeled after the District of Columbia
Bail Agency, which was created by Congress to assist the D.C. courts in implementing
the Bail Reform Act of 1966, id. §§ 3041, 3141-3143, 3146-3152, 3568 (1970). SENATE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 25, 51. The Bail Reform Act revised existing bail practices in
federal courts by creating a presumption in favor of release without money bond before
trial. This reform was based on the experience of a number of vohntary bail projects,
which had demonstrated that family ties, employment, residence in the community, and
the absence of a substantial criminal record are factors more likely to ensure the ap-
pearance of a defendant than the posting of bond. S. REP. No. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1965). The D.C. Bail Agency was established to provide information regarding these
factors; its functions were later expanded to include supervision of released defendants.
7. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) (Supp. V 1975) provides in part:
[S]uch information as may be contained in the agency's files or presented in its
report or which shall be divulged during the course of any hearing shall be used
only for the purpose of a bail determination and shall otherwise be confidential. In
their respective districts, the Division of Probation or the Board of Trustees shall
issue regulations establishing policy on the release of agency files. Such regulations
shall create an exception to the confidentiality requirement so that such information
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been imposed through regulations issued by the Division of Probation
and the boards of trustees. 9
Title II requires the Director of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts to report annually to Congress on the progress
of the PSA experiment. 10 The first annual report, submitted on
September 30, 1976, notes that "one serious problem already facing
pretrial services agencies is that of 'confidentiality.' "11 The report
concludes that the prbblem must be studied and that present regula-
tions should be revised on the basis of further PSA experience.'
2
This Note argues that current confidentiality restrictions conflict
with the stated objectives of Title II. The Note examines the reasons
for confidentiality in light of the structure and purposes of the Title
II program, and offers a framework for striking a balance between
shall be available to members of the agency's staff and to qualified persons for pur-
poses of research related to the administration of criminal justice. Such regulations
may create an exception to the confidentiality requirement so that access to agency
files will be permitted by agencies under contract [to act as custodians of persons
released]; to probation officers for the purpose of compiling a presentence report
and in certain limited cases to law enforcement agencies for law enforcement pur-
poses. In no case shall such information be admissible on the issue of guilt in any
judicial proceeding, and in their respective districts, the Division of Probation or
the Board of Trustees may permit such information to be used on the issue of
guilt for a crime committed in the course of obtaining pretrial release.
9. Title II requires the Division of Probation and the boards of trustees in the five
trustee districts to "issue regulations establishing policy on the release of agency files."
Id. § 3154(1). In 1976 the Division of Probation promulgated such regulations. Division
of Probation Regulations-Confidentiality of Pretrial Services Agency Information (un-
dated) (on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Division of Ptobation Regula-
tions]. The General Counsel of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
has issued a legal memorandum in support of these regulations. Confidentiality of
Pretrial Services Agencies Information (undated) (on file with Yale Law Journal) [here-
inafter cited as Legal Memorandum].
PSAs in the District of Maryland, the Western District of Missouri, and the Eastern
District of New York have developed written confidentiality regulations. Rules for Con-
fidentiality of PRETRIAL SERVICES, District of Maryland (undated) (on file with
Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Maryland Regulations]; Proposed Rules and
Regulations Pertaining to the Confidentiality and Release of Information of the Pre-
trial Services Agency, Western District of Missouri (undated) (on file with Yale Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Missouri Regulations]; Statement of General
Policy as to Functions and Procedures of the Pretrial Services Agency for the United
States District Court, Eastern District of New York § 2 (undated) (on file with Yale Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Eastern New York Regulations].
PSAs in the Eastern District of Michigan and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
simply follow the Division of Probation regulations. Telephone Interview with Arthur
Goussy, Chief Pretrial Services Officer, Eastern District of Michigan (Oct. 19, 1976) (notes
on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Goussy Interview]; Telephone In-
terview with Robert Williams, Chief Pretrial Services Officer, Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania (Oct. 19, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Williams
Interview].
10. 18 U.S.C. § 3155(a) (Supp. V 1975).
11* ADINISTRATIvE OFFicE REPORT, supra note 3, at 42.
12. Id. at 42-43.
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confidentiality and disclosure that is consistent with the role of the
PSA in the pretrial release process. A screening procedure for the
disclosure of PSA information that would help maintain this balance
is proposed. Finally, the Note evaluates specific instances in which
current restrictions imposed by the statute and regulations conflict
with the goals of Title II and thus jeopardize the effective administra-
tion of the pretrial release process and the success of the PSA program.
I. PSA Procedures
A. Collection of Information
Title II authorizes PSAs to "[c]ollect, verify, and report promptly
to the judicial officer information pertaining to the pretrial release
of each person charged with an offense,' 3 to "recommend appropriate
release conditions for each such person,"' 4 and to "[s]upervise persons
released into [their] custody."1
In order to gauge the likelihood that a defendant will appear for
subsequent court proceedings, the PSA interviews each defendant to
elicit information about his community ties, financial resources, em-
ployment, family situation, and criminal record.' The defendant is
not asked any questions regarding the circumstances of the offense
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) (Supp. V 1975).
A judicial officer is "any person or court authorized pursuant to section 3041 of this
title [Title 18, U.S.C.], or the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to bail or otherwise
release a person before trial or sentencing or pending appeal in a court of the United
States, and any judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia." Id. § 3156(a)(1).
Among those so authorized by § 3041 are United States Justices, judges, or magistrates.
The initial bail hearing is ordinarily conducted by a United States magistrate. FED. R.
CRIUM. P. 5. Subsequent proceedings are ordinarily conducted by a magistrate or the
district court judge to whom the case has been assigned for trial.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) (Supp. V 1975).
15. Id. § 3154(3). PSAs may also operate facilities for the custody or care of released
defendants such as residential halfvay houses or addict and alcoholic treatment centers,
id. § 3154(4), and assist released defendants in obtaining employment and medical, legal,
or social services, id. § 3154(7). They also prepare biweekly pretrial detention reports,
required under Rule 48(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are
designed to aid the district court in eliminating unnecessary detention, id. § 3154(8).
16. The factors that the court may consider in setting release conditions in noncapital
cases include:
the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence
against the accused, the accused's family ties, employment, financial resources,
character and mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his
record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight
to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings.
Id. § 3146(b) (1970). In capital cases the court may also consider the risk of danger to
another person or to the community. Id. § 3148.
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for which he has been arrested.'7 To verify the information provided
by a defendant, the PSA contacts his family, friends, or employer, and
checks his criminal record with federal and local law enforcement
agencies.' 8
Based on the information collected, the PSA submits a brief report
to the judicial officer summarizing the information gathered and
recommending release conditions for each defendant. 19 This report
17. Title II does not prohibit the collection of information regarding the offense.
Although such information is relevant to the bail determination under id. § 3146(b),
Division of Probation Regulation l(a)(2) provides:
A pretrial services officer shall record only information pertinent to the determina-
tion of bail and shall not record, or indicate in any form, any information related to
an alleged offense(s), except such information as is obtained from documents of
public record. When such information of public record is obtained and recorded,
the pretrial services officer shall identify its source.
All five trustee districts have similar regulations. Maryland Regulation 1(a)(2), supra
note 9; Proposed Missouri Regulation 1(a)(2), supra note 9; Eastern New York Regula-
tion 2:1, supra note 9; Division of Probation Regulation 1(a)(2), supra note 9 (followed
in Michigan and Pennsylvania, see note 9 supra).
By not asking for or recording information relating to the offense, PSAs attempt to
minimize the possibility that incriminating admissions will be disclosed to the prosecutor
and used against a defendant. This Note assumes that PSAs will not collect information
about the offense. Were such information collected, greater safeguards would be neces-
sary than those proposed in this Note.
It should be emphasized, however, that by restricting the scope of its inquiry, the PSA
may limit its ability to help courts make more informed release decisions. Where a de-
fendant is charged with a serious crime, information concerning the nature and circum-
stances of the offense and the weight of the evidence against the accused may have far
greater influence on the bail decision than the information currently collected by PSAs.
If the evidence against a defendant is strong, a judicial officer may fear that the possi-
bility of long incarceration will induce a defendant to flee despite his community ties, or
that, if released, the defendant will commit another crime. SENATE REI'oRT, supra note 1,
at 24-25. Unless PSAs can provide an objective evaluation of these factors, they will be
unable to assist the court in these difficult cases. This in turn may limit their ability to
achieve reductions in pretrial detention for high-risk defendants.
18. Verification is conducted by telephone, correspondence, or visits to a defendant's
residence. The verification process may generate additional information about a de-
fendant for the PSA file, including educational or military records and details of prior
contact with law enforcement agencies. Interview with John Schoenberger, Pretrial
Services Officer, Southern District of New York, in New York City (Aug. 25, 1976) (notes
on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Schoenberger Interview]; Telephone
Interview with Dan Ryan, Chief Pretrial Services Officer, Eastern District of New York
(Sept. 21, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Ryan Inter-
view].
19. In recommending conditions of release the PSA is governed by the provisions of
the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3041, 3141-3143, 3146-3152, 3568 (1970). In noncapital
cases the Act requires the judicial officer to release a defendant on his personal
recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond unless the officer
determines "that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person
as required." Id. § 3146(a). If such a determination is made,
the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the above methods of
release, impose the first of the following conditions of release which will reasonably
assure the appearance of the person for trial or, if no single condition gives that
assurance, any combination of the following conditions:
(1) place the person in the custody of a designated person or organization agree-
ing to supervise him;
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form contains substantially less information and detail than the PSA
file itself.
20
If a defendant is released under the supervision of the PSA, a
schedule of contacts with the PSA is established to ensure the de-
fendant's continued presence in the jurisdiction, to notify the de-
fendant of required court appearances, and to monitor the defendant's
compliance with any other conditions of release imposed by the
court.2 ' Supervision of the defendant may result in the production of
additional summary reports to the court, since the PSA must "inform
the court of all apparent violations of pretrial release conditions or
arrests of persons released to its custody or under its supervision and
recommend appropriate modifications of release conditions. 22
(2) place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the person
during the period of release;
(3) require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount and the
deposit in the registry of the court, in cash or other security as directed, of a sum
not to exceed 10 per centum of the amount of the bond, such deposit to be returned
upon the performance of the conditions of release;
(4) require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or the
deposit of cash in lieu thereof; or
(5) impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure appearance
as required, including a condition requiring that the person return to custody after
specified hours.
Id. In capital cases or after conviction, a defendant may be ordered detained if the
judicial officer finds that none of the above conditions "will reasonably assure that the
person will not flee or pose a danger to any person or to the community" or "if it
appears that an appeal is frivolous or taken for delay." Id. § 3148.
Defendants are supervised by the PSA pursuant to id. § 3146(a)(1). Typical conditions
of release recommended by PSAs as part of PSA supervision include: (1) requiring a
defendant to call in and speak to a pretrial services officer weekly; (2) requiring a de-
fendant to enter a treatment program if he has a drug problem; (3) requiring a de-
fendant to come into the PSA office on a regular basis if he has weak ties to the
community; (4) requiring a defendant to seek or maintain employment; and (5) requiring
a defendant to remain in the jurisdiction. Schoenberger Interview, supra note 18; Ryan
Interview, supra note 18.
20. The PSA summary report to the judicial officer contains the defendant's name,
address, telephone number, length of residence in community, social security number,
name and address of employer or school, length of time in job or school, and weekly
earnings. The report also briefly summarizes the defendant's family ties, financial
resources, health, and prior convictions and record of appearance. This summary adds
few, if any, specific facts to the report. For a description of the range of information in
the PSA file, see note 23 infra.
21. The process of supervising a defendant and monitoring his compliance with
conditions of release is comparable to probation or parole supervision. The PSA seldom
places a defendant under physical surveillance, although compliance with the condition
that a defendant live at a specific address may be checked by a "home visit." PSAs main-
tain contact with a defendant by telephone, letter, or through regular visits by a de-
fendant to the PSA office. Where a defendant is required to participate in a drug or
alcohol program, the PSA receives reports of his compliance from the staff of the
rehabilitation program. Schoenberger Interview, supra note 18; Ryan Interview, supra
note 18.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(5) (Supp. V 1975). Supplemental reports to the court may be
required if a defendant or the Government seeks to modify a defendant's release condi-
tions. See id. § 3154(2). An updated report may also be presented to the court when a
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Thus, in the course of its relationship with a defendant, the PSA
develops a file that may contain a substantial amount of information,
including a record of the defendant's contacts with the PSA and of
his compliance with the conditions of his release.23
B. Restrictions on the Use and Disclosure of PSA Information
In federal districts without a PSA program, information provided
by a defendant in order to secure pretrial release is not confidential.
A defendant is advised of his right to remain silent by an assistant
United States attorney prior to the bail hearing,24 or by the judicial
officer at the outset of the hearing.23 If a defendant waives his right
to remain silent and volunteers information regarding his eligibility
for pretrial release, anything he says may later be used against him.2 6
Congress believed, however, that these procedures would deter de-
fendants from providing the information PSAs would need to func-
tion effectively.27 Title II therefore provides that PSA information
"shall be used only for the purpose of a bail determination and shall
defendant enters a plea, when a case is assigned to a particular judge, when a defendant
fails to appear or is convicted, or whenever a reevaluation of eligibility for release would
be appropriate. Schoenberger Interview, supra note 18; Ryan Interview, supra note 18.
23. The PSA file includes all information solicited from the defendant during the
initial interview, including name, age, place of birth, citizenship, sex, race, physical
description, education, marital status, dependents, residence, criminal record, detailed
financial information, history of medical or psychological problems, drug or alcohol abuse,
employment, and military service, and the names of persons who can verify this informa-
tion. The file also includes information received from employers, educational institutions,
the military, doctors, and law enforcement agencies that have been contacted by the PSA
to verify information provided by the defendant. This may include information about the
defendant's previous contact with law enforcement agencies (e.g., presentence investiga-
tions, reports of psychological and family history prepared by probation departments or
juvenile authorities, or the details of previous offenses). Schoenberger Interview, supra
note 18; Ryan Interview, supra note 18; author's inspection of representative PSA files in
the Southern District of New York (Aug. 25, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
24. In some federal districts a defendant is interviewed prior to the bail hearing by
an assistant United States attorney in order to gather information about his eligibility
for bail. Telephone Interview with Guy Villetts, Chief Pretrial Services Officer, Pretrial
Services Branch, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Dec. 14, 1976) (notes
on file with Yale Law Journal); Ryan Interview, supra note 18. Since a defendant may
also be asked for information about the offense with which he is charged, he must be
advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See United States v.
Duvall, 537 F.2d 15, 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 950 (1976) (defendant's Miranda
rights must be scrupulously observed in "pre-appearance interviews" by United States
attorney).
Courts have held, however, that information obtained without advising a defendant of
his Miranda rights need not be excluded where law enforcement officials only inquire
about "pedigree" information, such as name, age, address, or marital status. See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1090 (1976) (also citing similar holdings in other circuits).
25. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c).
26. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
27. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
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otherwise be confidential," and that it shall not be "admissible on the
issue of guilt in any judicial proceeding."2  
Title II creates exceptions to this confidentiality requirement. PSAs
must provide access to PSA files to "members of the agency's staff and
to qualified persons for purposes of research related to the administra-
tion of criminal justice."2 9 PSAs are authorized to create additional
exceptions to the statute's confidentiality restrictions in order to per-
mit the release of PSA information (i) to agencies under contract to
provide services to defendants under PSA supervision, (ii) to proba-
tion departments to aid in the preparation of presentence reports,
(iii) to law enforcement agencies, "in certain limited cases . . . for law
enforcement purposes,"30 and (iv) to prosecutors to be admitted on
the issue of guilt for a "crime committed in the course of obtaining
pretrial release." 3' The statute requires the Division of Probation and
the boards of trustees to issue regulations establishing policy on the
release of agency files.
32
II. The Need for Confidentiality and the Role of the
PSA in the Pretrial Release Process
A. Title H1 and the Structure of the Pretrial Release Process
The PSA program is part of a comprehensive reform designed "to
improve the efficiency and deterrent of the federal criminal system." 33
Title II of the Speedy Trial Act sets out three major goals for the
28. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) (Supp. V 1975). The text of the confidentiality provision is set
out in full at note 8 supra.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) (Supp. V 1975).
30. Id. The statute itself does not specify the limited cases or purposes contemplated
by this exception. Nor are they discussed explicitly in the legislative history. The
Senate Report suggests that the exception might refer to the use of PSA information for
the purpose of impeaching a defendant's credibility or for the purpose of prosecuting a
defendant for perjury. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52. The exception could also be
used to permit the release of PSA information to law enforcement officials for investiga-
tion of violations of release conditions or crimes committed in the course of obtaining
pretrial release. See note 83 infra.
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) (Supp. V 1975). This Note focuses on the disclosure of PSA in-
formation to prosecutors and police. Disclosure to other agencies or individuals for pur-
poses referred to in the statute is not discussed, since use of PSA information for these
purposes does not raise serious problems of confidentiality. For example, the confidential-
ity of presentence reports is protected by FD. R. CRIM. P. 32(c). Research information may
be protected by required anonymity and nondisclosure agreements. See SENATE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 52. Information released to contract agencies can also be protected by
nondisclosure agreements. The Division of Probation regulations, for instance, require
contract agencies to complete a nondisclosure agreement. Division of Probation Regula-
tion 4(a), supra note 9.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) (Supp. V 1975).
33. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 24.
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experimental PSA program: reduction of absconding, of crime com-
mitted by defendants released before trial, and of unnecessary pretrial
detention. PSAs cannot, however, realize these objectives indepen-
dently. The power to release defendants on bail and to set and modify
release conditions rests with the court; the power to arrest and pros-
ecute defendants for failure to appear or for crimes committed on
release rests with law enforcement agencies. PSAs can only achieve
their purposes by assisting these institutions, primarily by collecting
and reporting information designed to influence decisions regarding
a defendant's pretrial release status.
The success of the PSAs thus depends upon their ability to provide
useful information and acceptable recommendations to courts and
law enforcement agencies. If PSAs unduly restrict disclosure, courts
and law enforcement agencies may have insufficient information to
achieve the improved pretrial release process envisioned by Title II.
Moreover, these institutions may come to perceive the PSA as an
advocate for the defendant, thus creating an adversary tension. Since
courts and prosecutors are under no obligation to accept PSA recom-
mendations, this tension may jeopardize the cooperation PSAs need
to operate effectively.
Unfortunately, Congress failed to tailor the confidentiality restric-
tions of Title II to the role of the PSA program in the administration
of the pretrial release process. The confidentiality provisions were
adopted without careful analysis of their impact. The Senate sub-
committee that developed the legislation did not scrutinize the con-
fidentiality provisions of the statute;34 nor were they discussed during
34. The confidentiality provisions were added to the final version of the Senate bill
that became the Speedy Trial Act of 1974. Compare S. 754, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
reprinted in Speedy Trial Act of 1974: Hearings on S. 754, H.R. 7873, H.R. 207, H.R.
658, H.R. 687, H.R. 773, and H.R. 4807 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-37 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 1974 Hear-
ings], with S. 754, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in Speedy Trial: Hearing on S.
754 before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11-32 (1973). The confidentiality provisions received virtually no
attention in the hearings. The only reference to the provisions is a letter from Bruce
Beaudin, Director of the D.C. Bail Agency, to the minority counsel of the House Judiciary
Committee. 1974 Hearings, supra at 766.
Mark Gitenstein, former Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Judiciary Committee and principal draftsman of Title II, stated that the
confidentiality provisions of the statute were added to the bill largely at the suggestion
of Beaudin. According to Gitenstein, Beaudin believed that liberalized disclosure resulting
from amendments to the D.C. Bail Agency Act, D.C. CODE § 23-1303 (1973), had adversely
affected the level of defendant cooperation. Telephone Interview with Mark Gitenstein
(May 28, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Gitenstein In-
terview]. The legislative history indicates that the decision to grant PSAs discretion on
the issue of confidentiality was a compromise between proponents of blanket con-
fidentiality and advocates of liberal disclosure. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
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debates on the bill.33 This lack of analysis led to basic anomalies in
the statute. For example, although Title II seeks to control abscond-
ing and crime on bail, the basic "confidentiality requirement" of the
statute prohibits the use of PSA information in prosecutions for such
crimes.36 These anomalies have been exacerbated by the regulations
adopted by the Division of Probation and the boards of trustees. The
regulations, for instance, prohibit the Government from examining
PSA reports and recommendations to the court at the bail hearin 3 7
and thus limit the ability of the PSA program to improve bail deci-
sions.
In order to develop a policy on confidentiality that is consistent
with the overall structure of the release process, the need for con-
fidentiality must be reexamined in light of the goals of Title II; the
reasons for confidentiality must be carefully analyzed and balanced
against the need to disclose PSA information to other institutions
involved in the pretrial release process.
B. The Confidentiality Principle
Confidentiality may be supported by three considerations-the co-
operation of defendants, fairness, and privacy. Of these, only the first
was explicitly noted by Congress. Congress understood that the success
of the PSA program would depend in part on the willingness of de-
fendants to provide complete and accurate information. For example,
if a defendant were to conceal names of friends or associates who
could verify his roots in the community, the PSA might recommend
a needlessly high bond, which could cause unnecessary detention of
the defendant. 38 Congress was particularly concerned that defendants
would be reluctant to speak to PSA interviewers if the information
provided could be used against them on the issue of guilt.39 The in-
discriminate release of PSA information to private parties may also
discourage defendants from providing complete and accurate informa-
tion. Defendants have expressed concern, for instance, that the release
35. Floor discussion of the Speedy Trial Act occurred only in the House of Representa-
tives, 120 CoNG. Rrc. H12,549 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1974); the confidentiality provisions were
never mentioned.
36. Although Title I permits the limited use of PSA information "for law enforce-
ment purposes," this exception is itself circumscribed by the statute's prohibition against
use of PSA information on the issue of guilt in any judicial proceeding. 18 U.S.C. § 3154
(1) (Supp. V 1975).
37. See p. 528 and notes 52-53 infra.
38. Similarly, a defendant's failure to disclose a drug abuse problem might deprive
the PSA of an opportunity to prevent absconding or the commission of a criminal of-
fense on release by providing for enrollment in a treatment center.
39. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
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of information collected by the PSA might jeopardize their jobs or
create domestic difficulties. 40 Defendants have also expressed fear that
the release of PSA information to law enforcement officials might
subject their friends or associates to investigation or surveillance.
41
Confidentiality was thus incorporated into Title II as one means of
encouraging defendant participation in the program.
42
Restrictions on the use of PSA information can also be justified by
considerations of fairness. A defendant is ordinarily interviewed
shortly after his arrest when he is under stress and unrepresented by
counsel. 43 His statements may not be entirely voluntary, since without
his cooperation the PSA may be unable to recommend favorable re-
lease conditions. To the extent that a defendant's cooperation with
the PSA is compelled by these circumstances, the use of his statements
40. For example, defendants sometimes ask that their employer or family not be
called even to verify information about the defendant's roots in the community because
they fear that knowledge of their arrest will have adverse consequences. Ryan Interview,
supra note 18; Telephone Interview with Bruce Beaudin, Director, D.C. Bail Agency
(Aug. 17, 1976) (notes on file With Yale Law Journal) hereinafter cited as Beaudin
Interview].
41. The Director of the.D.C. Bail Agency, Bruce Beaudin, stated that defendants in
some cases give false or incomplete information to the police, but give accurate informa-
tion to the bail agency. Defendants have told Beaudin that this is because they want to
protect their friends or family from being questioned or harassed by the police. Beaudin
Interview, supra note 40.
42. In some cases the RzSA could obtain information relevant to a bail determination
from sources other than a defendant. A defendant's criminal record, for example, is
available. However, PSAs could not possibly obtain all the information necessary for
developing release recommendations from such routine sources, nor could they com-
plete independent investigations in the time between a defendant's arrest and the bail
hearing.
43. Although defendants are told by the PSA that they have the right to talk to a
lawyer before answering any questions, a defendant has no constitutional right to
counsel at the PSA interview. The test for whether an accused would be entitled to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment is whether the interview is a "critical stage" of
the prosecution, i.e., whether the interview could substantially prejudice a defendant's
rights and whether the skill of counsel could help prevent that prejudice. Coleman. v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 7 (1970). Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1974), indicates that the
PSA interview would not meet the "critical stage" test. In Gerstein, the Supreme Court
held that a hearing to determine whether probable cause exists for a warrantless arrest,
even though conducted after an information had been filed against the defendant,
was not a critical stage of the prosecution "[b]ecause of its limited function and its non-
adversary character." Id. at 122. Since the PSA interview is similarly limited and non-
adversarial in character, it would not be a critical stage of the prosecution for which
counsel must be provided.
A defendant might also assert a right to counsel to protect his Fifth Amendment rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). But it has been held that a defendant
is entitled to the protections created by Miranda only when he is questioned for in-
vestigative purposes. Miranda warnings are not required where information is solicited
for purposes not related to the offense, such as booking, setting bail, or arraignment.
United States ex rel. Hines v. LaVallee, 521 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1090 (1976). As long as the PSA does not question a defendant about
his offense and solicits information only to assess eligibility for pretrial release, a
defendant would not be entitled to counsel during the PSA interview under Miranda.
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 86: 513, 1977
as evidence against him on the issue of guilt at trial may be constitu-
tionally prohibited.44 A defendant also may be more likely to offer
information to a PSA representative than to a law enforcement officer,
since the social service role of the PSA interviewer may encourage a
defendant to be more unguarded in his statements. The PSA's declara-
tion that it seeks information to help a defendant secure pretrial re-
lease may be viewed as creating an implied agreement that informa-
tion will not be used for purposes other than setting release
conditions. 45 Under these circumstances it would be unfair to exploit
44. Although a defendant's participation in the PSA investigation is technically
voluntary, the defendant usually must cooperate to obtain favorable pretrial release
conditions. If the PSA has no information, it will probably be forced to recommend a
high money bond. A defendant who must furnish information in order to obtain pre-
trial release is arguably forced to sacrifice his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent
in order to exercise his Eighth Amendment right to nonexcessive bail. This analysis was
adopted in State v. Williams, 343 A.2d 29, 33 (N.H. 1975), in which the court held that
statements made at a bail hearing were not admissible against a defendant at his later
trial. Cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (tension between Fourth
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and Fifth Amend-
ment right to remain silent requires that defendant's testimony to establish standing in
support of a motion to suppress evidence not be admitted as evidence against him at
trial on issue of guilt); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (waiver of
privilege against self-incrimination induced by threat of removal from public office
under state forfeiture-of-office statute held involuntary and resulting statements in-
admissible in state criminal proceedings).
In its legal memorandum, the Division of Probation adopts the Simmons analysis and
argues that the Constitution requires a statutory prohibition against the admission of
PSA information on the issue of guilt at trial. Legal Memorandum, supra note 9, at 5-8.
Although this Note supports such a restriction as a matter of policy, it should be noted
that the Supreme Court recently has questioned the validity of the reasoning in Simmons.
In McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971), vacated on other grounds, 408 U.S. 941
(1972), the Court found no intolerable tension between the right to remain silent and the
right to be heard on punishment in a bifurcated trial where both factfinding and
sentencing are performed by a jury. The Court stated that to the extent the rationale
in Simmons was "based on a 'tension' between constitutional rights and the policies
behind them, the validity of that reasoning must now be regarded as open to question."
Id. at 212.
Moreover, although Simmons might prohibit the use of bail information to establish
a defendant's guilt on the charge for which he is arrested, it would not prohibit the
use of bail information for other purposes. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222,
226 (1971) (statements excluded from Government's case-in-chief because obtained in
violation of Miranda may be used to impeach); United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d
1334, 1342-44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079 (1974) (use immunity does not extend
to perjury); United States v. Smith, 206 F.2d 905, 907 (3d Cir. 1953) (use immunity does
not extend to offenses committed after immunized testimony).
45. In State v. Winston, 300 Minn. 314, 318-319, 219 N.W.2d 617, 620 (1974), the court
found that a bail agency's pledge not to ask questions regarding a defendant's offense
constituted an implied agreement that the information solicited would not be used at
trial. The bail agency had not in fact asked the defendant about his offense; the in-
formation introduced against the defendant by the state was his address, which had been
provided in response to questions relating to his eligibility for pretrial release. Never-
theless, the court based its decision both on the implied agreement and on its concern
that the admission of such evidence would jeopardize the bail program.
In Killough v. United States, 336 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1964), statements made by a de-
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a defendant's vulnerability by using this information against him at
trial.
A defendant's right to privacy also militates against the disclosure
of PSA information.40 PSAs routinely collect such information as a
defendant's criminal record, history of drug or alcohol abuse, and
names of friends and associates. Release of this information to law
enforcement agencies may subject a defendant or others to surveillance
or harassment, while the disclosure of this information to private
parties could damage a defendant's reputation or employment op-
portunities.
47
These three concerns-encouraging cooperation, ensuring fairness,
and respecting privacy-support a general principle of confidentiality.
This principle requires that the disclosure of PSA information be
carefully scrutinized, and permitted only where the need for dis-
closure outweighs that for confidentiality.
C. The Need for Disclosure
The primary role of the PSA in the Title II program is to improve
the release process by gathering and reporting to courts and law en-
forcement officials information regarding defendants and their pretrial
release behavior. Confidentiality restrictions that would prevent the
release of PSA information specifically designed to improve release
decisions, control absconding, or reduce the incidence of crime com-
mitted on release must bear an exceptionally heavy burden of justifica-
tion, since they would appear to frustrate the achievement of the
overall goals of the statute.48 In fact, such restrictions are unjustifiable
fendant to a jail worker to enable the jail to classify inmates were held inadmissible
against the defendant at trial because jail workers, if asked, assured defendants that
their answers would not be used against them. Although Killough did not inquire about
the confidentiality of his answers, the court found an "implied pledge of confidentiality
as to all inmates subjected to classification questions" on the ground of "fundamental
fairness" required by the due process clause. Id. at 932.
46. According to the draftsman of Title II, the confidentiality provisions of the
statute were intended to protect the privacy of defendants, although this purpose was not
explicitly articulated in the legislative history. Gitenstein Interview, supra note 34.
47. PSAs are not covered by the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. V 1975),
because PSAs, as part of the federal court system, are not considered to be federal
agencies within the meaning of the Act. See id. §§ 552a(a), 552(e). Nevertheless, the Act
provides a useful guide for determining the appropriate scope of disclosure of PSA in-
formation to private parties under Title II. It prohibits unauthorized disclosure of federal
agency records for purposes incompatible with the purposes for which the information
was collected. Id. § 552a(b)(3).
48. Application of the confidentiality principle will ordinarily prevent the release of
PSA information for purposes unrelated to Title II. The use of PSA information to in-
vestigate pending charges against a defendant or to investigate alleged criminal activity
by his family or associates would, for instance, clearly undermine the goals implicit in
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since the disclosure of PSA information for these Title II purposes
would not substantially threaten the concerns underlying the need
for confidentiality. Fairness, for instance, is threatened primarily if
PSA information is used to prove a defendant's guilt in the prosecu-
tion of the charge for which he has been arrested. Considerations of
fairness would not be implicated if PSA information were used in
prosecutions for absconding or crimes committed on release, because
a defendant cannot incriminate himself in a bail interview with
respect to acts that have not yet been committed. Moreover, while a
defendant might infer that information provided for bail purposes
would not be used with respect to pending charges, a defendant would
reasonably expect such information to be used in monitoring his pre-
trial release behavior.
The privacy of defendants would not be violated by the release of
PSA information for Title II purposes because those purposes do not
require that the PSA investigate defendants or their family and friends
regarding matters unrelated to a defendant's release status. Nor would
Title II purposes entail the use of such information in ways calculated
to harass or embarrass defendants.
Finally, it is unlikely that the release of PSA information to serve
the objectives of Title II would deter defendants from cooperating
with the program. Although little is known about the specific factors
that encourage or inhibit defendant cooperation, it' seems clear that
the principal barriers to cooperation would be the use of PSA informa-
tion to prosecute pending charges or to investigate a defendant or his
associates in matters unrelated to the release process. Neither of these
concerns, however, would be implicated in the release of PSA informa-
tion for Title II purposes. The potential use of PSA information in
connection with prosecutions for absconding or for crimes committed
on release could only be of remote concern to most defendants in
deciding whether to cooperate, since at the time of the bail interview
they are presumably not contemplating jumping bail or committing
a subsequent crime. And defendants are advantaged to the extent
that the release of PSA information helps create a pretrial release sys-
tem that is efficient and equitable.
the confidentiality principle. The use of PSA information for some other non-Title II
purposes, however, might not violate the confidentiality principle, because disclosure
might not be unfair, threaten a defendant's privacy, or deter cooperation. In addition,
in some cases the need for disclosure for non-Title II purposes would outweigh the value
of confidentiality. These considerations might dictate disclosure of information to proba-
tion officers for the preparation of presentence reports (see note 31 supra), disclosure of
a defendant's whereabouts to law enforcement officials for execution of an arrest warrant,
and disclosure of information that tends to exculpate a codefendant (see, e.g., Division
of Probation Regulation 9, supra note 9).
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D. A Screen for Disclosure
The foregoing analysis of the appropriate balance between con-
fidentiality and disclosure in the context of the pretrial release process
justifies disclosure of PSA information only with respect to that data
in PSA files that must be released to facilitate achievement of Title
II goals. Therefore, even when PSA information is legitimately re-
leased to other agencies in the pretrial release process, the scope of
disclosure must be carefully scrutinized to assure that PSAs disclose
only as much information as is demonstrably related to a particular
Title II purpose. Limiting the scope of disclosure in this manner is
further justified because there is some risk that PSA information, once
released, could be used intentionally or inadvertently for any number
of purposes. For example, if the Government obtains information
necessary for its investigation of a defendant's violation of release
conditions, that information may be relevant to its investigation of
pending charges against a defendant; it may also create leads to
evidence of a defendant's guilt. This type of secondary or derivative
use of PSA information may be difficult to detect and control.49
Accordingly, in order to monitor the release of PSA information,
Title II should be amended to provide a systematic screening mecha-
nism to handle requests for PSA information. Such a procedure would
ensure that the PSA discloses only the specific facts required to ac-
commodate the particular Title II purpose for which information is
requested. Since this screening function would necessarily involve the
kind of delicate judgment and discretion routinely exercised by
judicial officers,50 screening should be carried out by the magistrate
or judge in each case. Vesting this authority in a judicial officer would
maintain the credibility of the PSA program from the perspective of
both the defendant and the Government. It would also enable the
court to record information released to the Government and hold it
responsible for any misuse or unauthorized disclosure of the informa-
tion.
49. Some of the information contained in PSA files is of a kind generally accessible
to law enforcement officials through other sources or independent investigation. See note
23 supra. In some cases, therefore, it would be difficult to establish that such information
was in fact obtained from PSA reports or files. Cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441, 469 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (criticizing use immunity because of difficulty of
establishing source of information used in criminal prosecution). Evidence discovered as
a result of PSA information may be too far removed from its original source to be
traced. The Government itself may not know whether it learned certain information from
a PSA or from independent sources.
50. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(c) (1970) authorizes judges in criminal trials to
inspect the statements of Government witnesses in camera to excise irrelevant material.
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III. Guidelines for Release of PSA Information
PSA information may be useful to law enforcement officials and
may be sought by them at a number of points in the criminal process.
This section evaluates the confidentiality provisions of Title II and the
regulations issued by the Division of Probation and the boards of
trustees in the context of these recurring occasions for exchange of
PSA information. It provides guidelines for determining the proper
scope of disclosure where current restrictions conflict with the pur-
poses of Title II, and proposes a number of revisions to existing
provisions. Some of these revisions may be implemented by agency
regulations under the current statute; others will require statutory
amendment.
A. Release Hearings
In federal districts without a PSA program, a judicial officer bases
his decisions concerning a defendant's release status on information
received in open court from the prosecutor, defense counsel, or the
defendant himself. Under Title II, however, the officer receives bail
information from another source-the PSA. Although Title II requires
PSAs to submit reports to the judicial officer,r1 neither the statute nor
its legislative history indicates whether the prosecutor or defense
counsel may have access to the PSA reports. The Division of Proba-
tion regulations provide that defense counsel, but not the prosecutor,
may review PSA reports submitted to the court.52 Similar provisions
or practices have been adopted by the five trustee districts.5 3
51. Id. § 3154(1) (Supp. V 1975).
52. Division of Probation Regulation 2(a), supra note 9, provides that a defendant
may read the PSA report unless the judicial officer finds that disclosure would violate a
pledge of confidentiality to the source of information contained in the report, or would
cause harm to the defendant or other persons. Regulation 2(b) provides:
The pretrial services report respecting the matter of release determination shall not
be disclosed to the attorney for the Government. The judicial officer may, in his
discretion, divulge to the attorney for the Government the recommendation of the
pretrial services officer regarding the defendant's release conditions.
This regulation has not been interpreted to prohibit a judicial officer from disclosing
orally the contents of the PSA report to the attorney for the Government. See note 65
infra.
53. Regulations in four of the five trustee districts permit a defendant to review the
PSA report. Maryland Regulation 7, supra note 9; Eastern New York Regulation 2:10,
supra note 9; Division of Probation Regulation 2(a), supra note 9 (followed in Michigan
and Pennsylvania, see note 9 supra). The PSA in Missouri currently does not disclose its
report to the defendant. Telephone Interview with Lewis Frazier, Chief Pretrial Services
Officer, Western District of Missouri (Oct. 19, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Frazier Interview]. Such disclosure would be permitted,
however, under its proposed regulations. Proposed Missouri Regulation 8, supra note 9.
None of the districts permits the attorney for the Government to inspect the PSA
528
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This is an inappropriate restriction on disclosure.5 4 Well-informed
and careful release decisions are necessary to achieve the goals of Title
II, and the quality of these decisions will be improved by disclosing
the PSA report to the prosecutor. Traditionally, the prosecutor has
played a dominant role in bail hearings as an advocate for the
Government's interest in ensuring a defendant's appearance at trial.
In order to represent that position intelligently, the prosecutor must
know all the facts before the court. Unless he knows the contents of
the PSA report, he cannot contest or supplement its factual informa-
tion or challenge the reliability of its conclusions.55 For this reason
the prosecutor has traditionally had access to reports to the court in
jurisdictions served by programs like Title 11.56 Moreover, by with-
holding information that is ordinarily available, 57 these restrictions
report. The PSAs in Michigan and Pennsylvania have adopted Division of Probation
Regulation 2(b), which explicitly prohibits disclosure of the PSA report to the Govern-
ment. See note 9 supra. The proposed Missouri regulations provide that information
contained in a pretrial services officer's report "shall not be disclosed to the United
States except upon order of court." Proposed Missouri Regulation 9, supra note 9.
Regulations in the other two districts are silent, but in practice such disclosure is not
permitted. Telephone Interview with Morris Street, Chief Pretrial Services Officer, Dis-
trict of Maryland (Oct. 19, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited
as Street Interview]; Ryan Interview, supra note 18.
54. Mark Gitenstein, the draftsman of Title II, stated that he did not understand the
confidentiality provisions to apply to information included in PSA reports to a court,
and expressed some surprise that it was so construed by the Division of Probation. Ac-
cording to Gitenstein, the provision was intended to maintain the confidentiality of
"extraneous" information irrelevant to the bail determination, such as incriminating
admissions. Gitenstein Interview, supra note 34.
55. Similar concerns for accuracy led to the disclosure of presentence reports to de-
fendants. FED. R. CIuM. P. 32(c)(3)(A). See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, 1974
Amendment, FEn. R. Ciust. P. 82(c)(3)(A), 18 U.S.C. app., at 1327 (Supp. V 1975). Any
material in the presentence report disclosed to a defendant or his counsel must also be
disclosed to the Government. FED. R. Caii. P. 32(c)(3)(C). Relying explicitly on the pre-
sentence report experience and rationale, one magistrate routinely discloses PSA reports
to counsel for the defense and the Government. Telephone Interview with Sol Schreiber,
United States magistrate, Southern District of New York (Nov. 5, 1976) (notes on file with
Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Schreiber Interview]. Reports of similar practices
in other districts are described at note 65 inf ra.
56. Reports of the D.C. Bail Agency must be disclosed to the Government under D.C.
CODE § 23-1303(a) (1973). Copies of reports prepared for the judge by bail agencies
operated by the Vera Institute of Justice in New York City are given to both the
assistant district attorney and defense counsel. Telephone Interview with Deborah Fitz-
gibbons, Deputy Director, Vera Pretrial Services Agency (Dec. 6, 1976) (notes on file
with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Fitzgibbons Interview]. In some jurisdictions
bail agencies are actually operated by law enforcement agencies. See BAIL AND SUMMONS:
1965, at 8 (Proceedings of the Institute on the Operation of Pretrial Release Projects and
Justice Conference on Bail and Remands in Custody 1965). Bail information provided
by defendants is therefore known to law enforcement officials and may be passed on to
prosecutors.
57. See p. 519 supra. One PSA has sought to continue the prior practice. Al-
though governed by the Division of Probation, it has refused to follow Division of
Probation regulations; reports are routinely given to the United States attorney because
"[d]isclosure of this kind has been the general rule in this Court historically [and] has
529
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may alienate the prosecutor,5s thus jeopardizing the cooperation
needed to effect improvements and reforms in the release process.
In opposing the release of the PSA report to the prosecutor, the
Division of Probation cites the risk that PSA information will be used
to investigate or prosecute the offense for which a defendant was ar-
rested. 59 Although the PSA does not ask a defendant about the cir-
cumstances of his offense and does not record unsolicited admissions,0
the Division of Probation argues that even routine background in-
formation about a defendant might become incriminating or might
provide leads for further investigation of his offense.0 1 PSA informa-
tion or facts derived from it might, therefore, actually be used to
prove a defendant's guilt on pending charges-a use of PSA informa-
tion forbidden by Title II. The Division of Probation contends that
the only way to control such use is to withhold the PSA report from
the Government.
2
The release of the PSA report to the Government would not, how-
ever, entail access to the entire PSA file. Reports to the court usually
contain general characterizations or summaries of a defendant's back-
ground-not specific information such as names or addresses. Most of
the detailed information in PSA files is not reported to the court at
all. 3 Thus, the PSA report does not ordinarily contain information
sufficiently specific to provide evidence in the prosecution of pending
charges or to offer substantial investigative leads. Indeed, the abuse
feared by the Division of Probation has not in fact occurred where bail
agency reports containing the same type of information are routinely
disclosed to the Government.
64
speeded up the hearings and resulted in quick agreement between the defendants and the
prosecution." Memorandum from Robert M. Latta, Chief Probation Officer, Los Angeles,
to Guy Willetts, Chief, Pretrial Services Branch, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (Apr. 16, 1976) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
58. Dan Ryan, Chief Pretrial Services Officer in the Eastern District of New York,
reported that the PSA was initially viewed as an adversary by some assistant United
States attorneys in his district, largely because they feared that PSAs would interfere with
their control over the early stages of a defendant's custody. According to Ryan, this
tension was exacerbated by the regulations adopted in that district prohibiting disclosure
of the PSA report to the attorney for the Government. Ryan Interview, supra note 18.
59. Legal Memorandum, supra note 9, at 28.
60. See pp. 516-17 & note 17 supra.
61. Telephone Interview with Judd Kutcher, Assistant General Counsel, Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts and coauthor of the Division of Probation regula-
tions (May 28, 1976) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Kutcher
Interview]. See State v. Winston, 300 Minn. 314, 219 N.V.2d 617 (1974). But see note 83
infra (Division of Probation regulation permitting release of defendant's whereabouts for
investigative purposes).
62. Kutcher Interview, supra note 61.
63. Compare note 20 supra with note 23 supra.
64. The Director of the D.C. Bail Agency stated that his agency has never detected
abuse of this kind, nor has the Government been challenged by a defense attorney
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Moreover, the Division of Probation regulations do not prohibit
the judicial officer from disclosing the contents of the report to the
prosecutor,65 and Title II itself clearly contemplates open bail hear-
ings. The statute refers, for instance, to PSA information "divulged
during the course of any hearing."6 6 The Division of Probation ac-
knowledges that much of the information contained in the PSA report
may be revealed orally at the bail hearing. 67 Under these circumstances,
the confidentiality of the report cannot realistically be guaranteed.
Thus, all PSA reports available to the court should be disclosed in
advance to all parties. Because disclosure of the PSA report would not
involve access to PSA files, screening by the court is not necessary.
Disclosure may be accomplished under the current statute by revision
of the PSA regulations. But to ensure uniform implementation, Title
II should be amended to require such disclosure.
B. Prosecution for Perjury or False Statement
Title II provides that PSA information shall not be admissible "on
the issue of guilt in any judicial proceeding."68 The statute, however,
does permit the Division of Probation and the boards of trustees to
make an exception to this prohibition and provide in their regulations
for the use of PSA information "on the issue of guilt for a crime com-
mitted in the course of obtaining pretrial release."'6 9 Neither the
statute nor the legislative history indicates the scope of this exception.
The phrase "in the course of obtaining pretrial release" suggests a
crime occurring contemporaneously with the bail interview or bail
hearing, and thus probably refers to perjury.70 Accordingly, the Divi-
regarding the source of its information. Beaudin Interview, supra note 40. Vera officials
also were unaware of any instances in which information contained in a pretrial services
report had been used by law enforcement officials to investigate or to prove pending
charges against a defendant. Fitzgibbons Interview, supra note 56.
65. Although Division of Probation regulations prohibit the judicial officer from
showing the PSA report to the attorney for the Government, see note 52 supra, the
Division of Probation interprets its regulations to permit oral disclosure of the contents
of the report, Kutcher Interview, supra note 61. Nor do any of the trustee districts
prohibit the judicial officer from disclosing the contents of the PSA report to the
Government. See note 53 supra. In fact, some magistrates in both trustee districts and
those governed by the Division of Probation either show the PSA report to the prosecutor
or state orally the facts contained in the PSA report that are relied upon in setting
release conditions. Other magistrates do not disclose the PSA report or its contents to
the Government. Goussy Interview, supra note 9; Frazier Interview, supra note 53;
Williams Interview, supra note 9; Schreiber Interview, supra note 55; Street Interview,
supra note 53.
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) (Supp. V 1975).
67. Kutcher Interview, supra note 61.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(l) (Supp. V 1975).
69. Id.
70. The legislative history suggests that Congress contemplated the use of PSA in-
formation in prosecutions for perjury. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52. De-
fendants could be prosecuted for perjury for statements made under oath to the court.
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sion of Probation regulations provide that PSA information "shall be
available to law enforcement agencies and admissible as evidence on
the issue of a defendant's guilt in a prosecution for perjury or false
statement allegedly committed in the course of obtaining pretrial
release." 7
Defendants may make false statements or commit perjury at all
stages of the release process. For example, defendants may make false
statements to the PSA or the court concerning their compliance with
release conditions or their failure to appear for a scheduled court ap-
pearance. The statute, however, may be read to limit the use of PSA
information to crimes committed while "obtaining" pretrial release,
i.e., crimes committed at the initial bail interview or bail hearing. The
Since statements made to PSA interviewers are not under oath, defendants who give false
information to the PSA cannot be prosecuted for perjury. See 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970).
Defendants can, however, be prosecuted under id. § 1001 for the knowing and willful
falsification or concealment of a material fact within the jurisdiction of any department
or agency of the United States. Under the reasoning of United States v. Bramblett, 348
U.S. 503, 509 (1955), a PSA is a "department or agency" of the United States within the
meaning of this statute.
The exception for crimes committed in the course of release might also be applied to
the bribing or threatening of a pretrial services officer. Arthur Goussy, Chief Pretrial
Services Officer in the Eastern District of Michigan, stated that one of his employees was
threatened by a defendant in the course of a bail interview. The interviewer put the
facts of the incident on record at the bail hearing, and, Goussy asserted, would have
been able to testify at trial because of the statutory exception for crimes committed in
the course of obtaining release. Goussy did not know, however, whether the defendant
in this particular case was actually charged with threatening. Goussy Interview, supra
note 9. Although permitted by the statute, the use of PSA information in the prosecu-
tion of such a crime would appear to conflict with the Division of Probation regulations,
adopted by the Eastern District of Michigan (see note 9 supra), which allow the use of
PSA information only in prosecutions for the crimes of perjury or false statement com-
mitted in the course of obtaining release. Division of Probation Regulation 7, supra
note 9.
Similarly, neither the Division of Probation regulations nor the regulations developed
by the boards of trustees in Pennsylvania and Missouri contain a general exception to the
confidentiality requirement for crimes committed in the course of obtaining release; they
limit the use of PSA information to prosecutions for perjury or false statement com-
mitted in the course of obtaining release. Division of Probation Regulation 7, supra note
9 (also followed in Pennsylvania, see note 9 supra); Proposed Missouri Regulation 7,
supra note 9. The District of Maryland has not adopted a regulation concerning the use
of PSA information in the prosecution of crimes committed in the course of obtaining
pretrial release. These regulations should be amended to permit the use of PSA informa-
tion in the prosecution of any crime committed in the course of obtaining pretrial release
in order to ensure the integrity of the PSA program. Such a regulation has been adopted
by the board of trustees in the Eastern District of New York. Eastern New York Regula-
tion 2:9, supra note 9.
71. Division of Probation Regulation 7, supra note 9 (emphasis in original). See Legal
Memorandum, supra note 9, at 26-27. Four of the five trustee districts have similar
provisions. Proposed Missouri Regulation 7, supra note 9; Eastern New York Regulation
2:9, supra note 9; Division of Probation Regulation 7, supra (followed in Michigan and
Pennsylvania, see note 9 supra). The board of trustees in Maryland has not adopted a
regulation concerning perjury.
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Division of Probation regulations perpetuate this confusion by track-
ing the language of the statute.
Title II should provide for the use of PSA information in prosecu-
tions for false statements made or perjury committed at any stage of
the release process. The PSA program was designed to improve the
quality of the bail determination by increasing the amount and
reliability of information available to the court. Penalizing the provi-
sion of false information to the PSA or the court will promote truth-
fulness. Indeed, if defendants were immune from sanctions for abusing
the PSA process, the confidence of courts and prosecutors in PSA re-
lease recommendations would ultimately be undermined. This policy
could be implemented by interpreting "obtaining pretrial release" to
include any act designed to secure or maintain favorable release condi-
tions. To assure adoption of this policy, Title II should be amended
to provide unambiguously for the use of PSA information in prosecu-
tions for giving false information to PSAs or courts at any stage of the
release process.
The appropriate scope of disclosure for these purposes could easily
be determined by a judicial screening procedure. Only the content of
the false statement and any information obtained by the PSA that
establishes the true facts need be released. Because the scope of in-
formation necessary for a false statement prosecution is narrow, the
possibility of indiscriminate derivative use should be slight.
C. Prosecution for Failure to Appear
A major goal of Title Il is the prevention and control of absconding,
yet the statutory prohibition on the use of PSA information "on the
issue of guilt in any judicial proceeding" apparently prohibits the
use of PSA information in a prosecution for failure to appear.7 2 The
Division of Probation regulations, which track the language of this
prohibition, have been interpreted to this effect. 73
72. The term "judicial proceeding" is not defined in the statute or the legislative
history. The draftsman of Title II has stated, however, that the statute was not intended
to prohibit the use of PSA information in a prosecution for failure to appear, although
he concedes that the statutory language has failed to make that intent explicit. Gitenstein
Interview, supra note 34.
73. The Division of Probation regulations, and those of the trustee districts, follow
the language of the statute. Division of Probation Regulation l(b), supra note 9 (also
followed in Michigan and Pennsylvania, see note 9 supra); Maryland Regulation l(b),
supra note 9; Proposed Missouri Regulation l(b), supra note 9; Eastern New York
Regulation 2:2, supra note 9. The Division of Probation interprets the statutory prohibi-
tion to prevent the use of PSA information in any criminal prosecution, including a
prosecution for failure to appear. Legal Memorandum, supra note 9, at 26; Kutcher In-
terview, supra note 61.
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Under federal law, the willful failure to appear as required before
any court or judicial officer is a criminal offense.74 This criminal
sanction serves as a deterrent to bail jumping. However, the con-
fidentiality requirement of Title II, and the regulations promulgated
pursuant to it, may cripple prosecutions for failure to appear. PSAs
often possess important evidence on the issue of willfulness: since they
notify defendants of their obligations to appear in court, often only
a PSA will know whether a defendant was aware of his court date."
The statutory and regulatory restrictions on the use of PSA informa-
tion may thus frustrate the efficient administration of the pretrial
release process by effectively preventing the imposition of sanctions
for absconding76
There is only limited information in a PSA file relevant to a prose-
cution for failure to appear. A judicial officer need release only in-
formation indicating whether a defendant knew about his scheduled
court appearance, or information confirming or refuting a defendant's
excuse for nonappearance. There is virtually no possibility that this
information could be used for purposes unrelated to Title II. Title
II should therefore be amended to provide for the use of PSA informa-
tion in all criminal prosecutions for failure to appear.
D. The Pending Charge and Impeachment of the Defendant
Although Title II prohibits the use of PSA information against a
defendant on the issue of his guilt, it does not prevent the use of PSA
information to impeach a defendant's credibility by demonstrating
74. 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1970). Since some magistrates include a requirement that a
defendant appear for all scheduled court appearances among the conditions of release set
at the initial bail hearing, failure to appear may often constitute a violation of release
conditions. Although the court may hold in contempt a defendant who fails to comply
with the conditions of his release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3151 (1970), violation of conditions is
usually not a criminal offense, and the legislative history states that PSA information
may be used in "hearings where there is an apparent violation of release conditions."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
75. Although the statute does not require PSAs to perform this notification function,
all 10 PSAs do notify defendants to some extent. The process is more systematic in some
districts than in others. Telephone Interview with Roger LeBoeuf, Pretrial Services
Specialist, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (Sept. 22, 1976) (notes on
file with Yale Law Journal).
76. The use of information gathered by the D.C. Bail Agency was originally permitted
only in bail hearings. In 1970 Congress specifically authorized the use of agency in-
formation in prosecutions for absconding because the earlier confidentiality provisions
had prevented Bail Agency melbers from informing the court whether a defendant had
been notified when to appear in court. D.C. CODE § 23-1303(d) (1973); H.R. REP. No. 91-
907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1970). Since the D.C. experience was the model for Title II,
the 1970 legislation suggests that had the confidentiality provisions of Title II received
sufficient scrutiny, they probably would have provided clearly for the use of PSA in-
formation in a prosecution for failure to appear.
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inconsistencies between testimony at trial and information in PSA
reports or files.77 Indeed, the legislative history indicates that the dis-
closure of PSA information to impeach a defendant's credibility was
one of the optional law enforcement purposes specifically contemplated
by the drafters of the confidentiality provisions."
The primary purpose of impeaching a defendant's credibility is to
secure conviction. The use of PSA information for this purpose has
the same effect as using PSA information on the issue of guilt-a use
inconsistent with the bases of the confidentiality principle7 9 The
Division of Probation's current regulations and those adopted by four
of the five boards of trustees prohibit the use of PSA information to
impeach a defendant.80 These regulations, however, could be modified
to permit such use. In order to ensure that current PSA policy remains
in effect and is implemented uniformly in each PSA district, Title II
should be amended to prohibit impeachment use.
E. Prosecution for Crime on Release
The control of crime on release is one of the major goals of Title
II. Congress established the PSA program in part to test whether in-
creased supervision of persons released prior to trial could reduce the
incidence of crime on bail. However, the statutory prohibition against
the use of PSA information on the issue of guilt in any judicial
proceeding prevents PSAs from providing information in prosecutions
for crimes committed on release.8'
Once again, this restriction on the use of PSA information conflicts
77. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) (Supp. V 1975).
78. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
79. See pp. 522-25 supra. It might be asserted that the use of PSA information to
impeach a defendant furthers the goals of Title II by penalizing defendants for making
false statements to the PSA. But this purpose would be accomplished only in those cases
in which a defendant goes to trial, takes the stand, and testifies truthfully. Prosecution
for false statement is therefore a more direct and effective method of promoting truthful
statements. Moreover, impeachment use raises substantial problems concerning the scope
of disclosure, for if impeachment is truly to serve as a check on the truthfulness of a
defendant's statements to the PSA, the prosecutor should be aware of the contents of the
entire PSA file. Such unrestricted governmental access would effectively destroy the con-
fidentiality of the PSA file and create the risk of extensive derivative use of PSA informa-
tion.
80. Division of Probation Regulation 8, supra note 9 (also followed in Michigan and
Pennsylvania, see note 9 supra); Maryland Regulation 8, supra note 9; Eastern New York
Regulation 11, supra note 9. Impeachment use is not mentioned in the proposed regula-
tions of the Missouri PSA.
81. Division of Probation Regulation 1(b), supra note 9, which prohibits the use of
PSA information on the issue of guilt in any judicial proceeding, has been interpreted
to prohibit use of PSA information in a prosecution for crimes committed on release.
Legal Memorandum, supra note 9, at 26; Kutcher Interview, supra note 61. The trustee
district regulations also prohibit the use of PSA information on the issue of guilt in any
judicial proceeding. See note 73 supra.
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with the larger goals of the PSA program. Depending on the intensity
of pretrial supervision, PSA officers may actually observe or acquire
evidence relating to crimes committed on release.8 2 By refusing to
release such information, the PSA not only prevents law enforcement
agencies from prosecuting such crimes, but also may antagonize other
institutions in the criminal justice system. If courts and prosecutors
come to regard the PSA as an advocate for the defendant, the PSA may
lose the cooperation necessary to function properly. Courts may be
reluctant to release high-risk defendants into PSA custody if con-
fidentiality restrictions prevent or seriously disadvantage prosecution
of defendants for crimes committed on release.
Title II should therefore be amended to permit the use of PSA
information in prosecutions for crimes committed on release. The
scope of disclosure for this purpose, however, could be very difficult
to limit; a prosecutor may argue that he needs-access to the entire
PSA file in order to develop a case against a defendant. Therefore, the
judicial officer should carefully supervise the disclosure of PSA in-
formation to prevent speculative or exploratory requests. Disclosure
should be limited to those situations in which specific and discrete
facts useful to the prosecutor can be identified. For example, the
judicial officer could disclose eyewitness accounts of a crime on release
or specific facts relating to the crime, such as the defendant's where-
abouts on a particular occasion, his knowledge of a specified skill, or
acquaintance with a certain individual.8 3
82. The Director of the D.C. Bail Agency reported that agency staff had occasionally
witnessed minor thefts by defendants on the premises of the bail agency. Beaudin In-
terview, supra note 40. Complaining witnesses had occasionally notified the bail agency
that defendants under bail agency supervision had assaulted or bothered them, and a
defendant's family or friends had often provided information that a defendant might
commit or had committed the crime of bail jumping. Id.
83. PSA information may also be useful to law enforcement officials in investigating
allegations of violations of release conditions, perjury, failure to appear, or crimes com-
mitted on release. Current statutory provisions that prohibit the use of PSA information
on the issue of guilt-for example, in prosecutions for failure to appear or for crimes
committed on release-would, however, also prohibit investigative use, since investiga-
tions are designed to develop proof of guilt. On the other hand, the statutory prohibition
against the use of PSA information on the issue of guilt would not bar the use of PSA
information to investigate perjury or violations of release conditions, since the use of
PSA information in violation hearings and perjury prosecutions is permitted. The dis-
closure of PSA information for investigative purposes in these cases is arguably further
justified under the optional exception to the confidentiality requirement permitting
the release of agency files "in certain limited cases to law enforcement agencies for law
enforcement purposes." 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) (Supp. V 1975).
Most of the regulations provide that PSA information may be released to law enforce-
ment agencies to investigate violations of conditions, failure to appear, and crimes
committed on release, but limit the scope of disclosure to the whereabouts of a de-
fendant. Division of Probation Regulation 6, supra note 9 (also followed in Michigan
and Pennsylvania, see note 9 supra); Maryland Regulation 6, supra note 9 (failure to
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Prompt adoption of this and other reforms proposed in this Note,
either by statutory amendment or agency regulation, will provide a
more accurate test of the ability of PSAs to improve the federal
pretrial release process, thereby fulfilling Congress's purpose in in-
stituting the Title II experiment.
appear only); Eastern New York Regulation 2:8, supra note 9 (failure to appear and
violation of conditions); Proposed Missouri Regulation 6, supra note 9. The limitation to
information concerning a defendant's whereabouts is not explained in the regulations or
in the Division of Probation legal memorandum, supra note 9. The Division of Probation
finds authority for its provisions on investigative use in the "limited law enforcement"
exception to the confidentiality requirement. Legal Memorandum, supra note 9, at 25.
Arguably, a defendant's whereabouts could never be used to prove his guilt, and thus
disclosure of such information would not conflict with the statutory prohibition. But see
State v. Winston, 300 Minn. 314, 219 N.W.2d 617 (1974). But where PSA information is
admissible on the issue of guilt in a particular proceeding, there is no reason to limit
the scope of disclosure for investigative purposes to information concerning a de-
fendant's whereabouts.
Title II should be amended to permit the release of any information that is demon-
strably related to the investigation of a defendant's pretrial release behavior. This would
include not only a defendant's whereabouts, but also information tending to refute or
corroborate an alibi, or establishing a defendant's relationship to a particular individual
or event. In the interim the Division of Probation and the boards of trustees should
amend their regulations to provide for such use where the statute currently permits, e.g.,
in connection with violations of release conditions or with crimes committed in the
course of obtaining release.
